


Do Software Companies Spread Cyber Risk?

Giorgio Ottonello¹ Emanuele Rizzo²


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2025 State-of-the-Field Conference on Cyber Risk to
Financial Stability




- Software companies provided in 2020 15.8 million U.S. jobs and contributed \$933 billion in direct value-added GDP to the U.S. economy alone. (software.org, 2021)



- Global damages from cyber crime expected to be \$10.5 trillion by 2025 (Cybersecurity Ventures, 2022)

Our Contribution



- We argue that the growth of software companies is a key driver of the rise in cybersecurity risk.

- We identify **software vulnerabilities** as a first-order driver of cyber risk
 - Affect many firms in the economy through software companies' digital supply chain
 - Third party risk that is hard to monitor

- We identify **software vulnerabilities** as a first-order driver of cyber risk
 - Affect many firms in the economy through software companies' digital supply chain
 - Third party risk that is hard to monitor
- Important to shape firms' policies as well as regulatory actions aimed at mitigating cybersecurity threats
- Implications for recognizing cyber risk as a systematic source of risk

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- Assemble a novel database linking vulnerability discoveries to software companies and their customers
- Identify the effect of vulnerabilities discovery on firms and study the market reaction

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 - Depresses firms' capital investment rate and R&D investment rate
- Stock market only slowly incorporates information about vulnerabilities
 - Frictions likely due to investors struggling to incorporate customer-supplier linkages


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
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 - Depresses firms' capital investment rate and R&D investment rate
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 - Frictions likely due to investors struggling to incorporate customer-supplier linkages
- Additional tests support the view that software companies growth and increase in cyber risk are connected

Our Setting




Our Setting




- From the vulnerabilities data, we manually identify 66 software companies that distribute vulnerable software.

Our Setting



- 1,947 software vulnerabilities; 466 vulnerabilities manually linked to cyberattacks.

Our Setting



- 3,875 unique customer companies; 1,431 customer firms every year, on average.

$$CyberAttacks_{c,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 Vulnerability_{c,t} + \gamma X_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t+1}$$

	All Attacks _{c,t+1} (1)	Vulnerability Attacks _{c,t+1} (2)	Other Attacks _{c,t+1} (3)
Vulnerability _{c,t}	0.106*** (4.41)	0.187*** (5.75)	0.029 (1.43)
Customer Controls _{c,t}	Yes	Yes	Yes
Customer FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	81,125	81,125	81,125
Adjusted r^2	0.016	0.004	0.013

- A vulnerability discovery increases the number of hacking attacks by 0.11 standard deviations.
- Dynamic effects on cyberattack probability [► Graphs](#)

- Absence of effects on non vulnerability-related attacks is already informative
 - Addresses alternative explanations where suppliers and customers are matched on similar characteristics, such as poor internal cybersecurity policies
- We perform two additional falsification tests:
 - Focus on minor vulnerabilities [▶ Table](#)
 - Placebo based on Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) block permutation test [▶ Graphs](#)

$$\text{Risk Var}_{c,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Vulnerability}_{c,t} + \gamma X_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t+1}$$

	RetVol _{c,t+1} (1)	Ivol _{c,t+1} (2)	Var 95% _{c,t+1} (3)	LPSD _{c,t+1} (4)
Vulnerability _{c,t}	0.046*** (3.39)	0.035*** (2.62)	-0.062*** (-4.66)	0.053*** (3.87)
Customer Controls _{c,t}	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Customer FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	81,125	81,125	81,125	81,125
Adjusted r^2	0.560	0.577	0.541	0.438

- A vulnerability discovery increases the return vol. by 0.046 standard deviations
- Dynamic effects on risk variables [► Graphs](#)

$$Real\ Var_{c,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 Vulnerability_{c,t} + \gamma X_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t+1}$$

	$I_{c,t+1}/K_{c,t}$ (1)	$R_{c,t+1}/G_{c,t}$ (2)	Sale Growth $_{c,t+1}$ (3)	Cybersecurity Rel.n $_{c,t+1}$ (4)
$Vulnerability_{c,t}$	-0.044** (-2.38)	-0.043*** (-2.68)	-0.037*** (-2.89)	0.111*** (3.36)
Customer Controls $_{c,t}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Customer FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	70,069	70,069	70,069	70,069
Adjusted r^2	0.202	0.756	0.025	0.652

- Literature linking increases in firm risk with decreases in investments (see, e.g., Bloom, 2009, Hassan et al., 2019)
- A vulnerability discovery decreases firm investments by 0.044 standard deviations
- Dynamic effects on real variables [► Graphs](#)

- Stock market prices do not seem to react in the short-term
- We show that market slowly incorporates the information

- Stock market prices do not seem to react in the short-term
- We show that market slowly incorporates the information
- We document that investors overlook supply chain links between software companies and their customers (see e.g., Cohen and Frazzini (2008))
 - Significant reaction when knowledge of customer–supplier links is not needed

$$CAR_c = \alpha_t + \beta Vulnerability_c + \gamma X_c + \epsilon_c$$

	Market-Adjusted CAR_c (1)	CAPM CAR_c (2)	5-factor CAR_c (3)
$Vulnerability_c$	-0.008 (-0.23)	0.001 (0.03)	-0.011 (-0.43)
Customer Controls _c	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	645,846	645,846	645,846
Adjusted r^2	0.039	0.042	0.015

- Stock market prices do not seem to react in the short-term

- Three potential explanation for the absence of reaction in the short-run:
 - 1 Vulnerabilities are inconsequential to the firm
 - Unlikely given previous results on cyberattacks and investments
 - 2 Market may be unaware of the consequences
 - Again unlikely given previous results on market-based risk variables
 - 3 Market only slowly incorporates the information
 - We should be able to observe the reaction over a longer window

$$R_{c,t+1} = \alpha_t + \alpha_c + \beta_1 \text{Vulnerability}_{c,t} + \gamma X_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t+1}$$

	Market-Adjusted _{c,t+1} (1)	CAPM _{c,t+1} (2)	5-factor Model _{c,t+1} (3)
Vulnerability _{c,t}	-0.008** (-2.45)	-0.007*** (-2.86)	-0.006** (-2.08)
Customer Controls _{c,t}	Yes	Yes	Yes
Customer FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	77,357	77,357	77,357
Adjusted r^2	0.062	0.062	0.040

- A vulnerability discovery decreases next quarter risk-adjusted stock returns by 0.6%-0.8%

- Investors may overlook supply chain links between software companies and their customers (see e.g., Cohen and Frazzini (2008))
- To assess this conjecture, we perform two tests where knowledge of customer–supplier links is not needed:
 - 1 Software company's stock price reaction to the discovery of a vulnerability
 - 2 Market reaction to the occurrence of a cyberattack due to a vulnerability

$$CAR_s = \alpha_t + \beta Vulnerability_s + \gamma X_s + \epsilon_s$$

	Market-Adjusted CAR_s (1)	CAPM CAR_s (2)	5-factor CAR_s (3)
$Vulnerability_s$	-0.221*** (-2.80)	-0.247*** (-2.73)	-0.277*** (-2.97)
Supplier Controls _s	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	213,024	213,024	213,024
Adjusted r^2	0.012	0.012	0.012

- On average, one vulnerability decreases 3-day CAR by 0.22%-0.27%

$$CAR_c = \alpha_t + \beta Attack_c + \gamma X_c + \epsilon_c$$

	Market-Adjusted CAR_c (1)	CAPM CAR_c (2)	5-factor CAR_c (3)
$Attack_c$	-1.280*** (-3.59)	-1.081*** (-2.97)	-1.125*** (-2.91)
Customer Controls $_c$	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	49,407	49,407	49,407
Adjusted r^2	0.016	0.025	0.010

- On average, one attack decreases 3-day CAR by 1.1%-1.3%

Link with Software Companies' Growth

- Ongoing regulatory debate on software companies as Systemically Important Entities (Welburn, 2024)
- We study whether the growth of software companies increases cybersecurity risk
 - We explore heterogeneity based on software supplier market share
- If software companies were a systemic source of cyber risk, the effect of vulnerabilities should have aggregate implications
 - We move the analysis at the industry-level [▶ Table](#)


$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{CyberAttacks}_{s,t+1} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Vuln.}_{s,t} + \beta_2 \text{Mktshare}_{s,t} \\
 & + \beta_3 \text{Vuln.}_{s,t} \times \text{Mktshare}_{s,t} + \gamma X_{s,t} + \epsilon_{s,t+1}
 \end{aligned}$$


	All Attacks _{s,t+1} (1)	Vulnerability Attacks _{s,t+1} (2)	Other Attacks _{s,t+1} (3)
MktShare _{s,t}	0.165*** (4.29)	0.071** (2.11)	0.157*** (3.94)
Vulnerability _{s,t}	0.028** (2.36)	0.030 (1.60)	0.011 (1.04)
MktShare _{s,t} × Vuln. _{s,t}	0.015*** (2.67)	0.015*** (2.93)	0.003 (0.47)
Supplier Controls _{s,t}	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supplier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	26,627	26,627	26,627
Adjusted r^2	0.336	0.175	0.262


- Dependent variable is the number of cyberattacks among the customers of the software company
- Results on firm risk, investments, and quarterly returns


Conclusion

- Expansion and concentration of software companies is a significant driver of cybersecurity risk
- Software vulnerabilities spread through digital supply chains, and:
 - Increase probability of cyberattacks for affected customers
 - Increase customer risk
 - Decrease customer investments and sale growth
- Strong link with the growth of software companies:
 - Worse consequences when software supplier has a larger market share
 - All results aggregate at the industry-level









$$CyberAttacks_{c,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 Minor\ Vulnerability_{c,t} + \gamma X_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t+1}$$

	All Attacks _{c,t+1} (1)	Vulnerability Attacks _{c,t+1} (2)	Other Attacks _{c,t+1} (3)
Minor Vulnerability _{c,t}	0.011 (1.24)	-0.003 (-0.44)	0.014 (1.53)
Customer Controls _{c,t}	Yes	Yes	Yes
Customer FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	81,125	81,125	81,125
Adjusted r^2	0.017	0.006	0.013




Figure A: All Attacks




Figure B: Vulnerability Attacks

$$R_{c,t+1} = \alpha_t + \alpha_c + \beta_1 \text{Vulnerability}_{c,t} + \gamma X_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t+1}$$

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- On average, one attack decreases 3-day CAR by 1.1%-1.3%

$$\begin{aligned} Risk\ Var_{s,t+1} = & \alpha + \beta_1 Vuln_{s,t} + \beta_2 Mktshare_{s,t} \\ & + \beta_3 Vuln_{s,t} \times Mktshare_{s,t} + \gamma X_{s,t} + \epsilon_{s,t+1} \end{aligned}$$

	RetVol _{s,t+1} (1)	Ivol _{s,t+1} (2)	Var 95% _{s,t+1} (3)	LPSD _{s,t+1} (4)
MktShare _{s,t}	-0.075*** (-5.50)	-0.091*** (-6.09)	0.061*** (4.86)	-0.063*** (-4.63)
Vulnerability _{s,t}	0.010*** (3.83)	0.009*** (3.76)	-0.009*** (-3.75)	0.011*** (4.53)
MktShare _{s,t} × Vuln _{s,t}	0.003** (2.19)	0.003** (1.99)	-0.004** (-2.41)	0.003** (2.05)
Supplier Controls _{s,t}	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supplier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	26,627	26,627	26,627	26,627
Adjusted r^2	0.530	0.538	0.507	0.460

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Real Var}_{s,t+1} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Vuln.}_{s,t} + \beta_2 \text{Mktshare}_{s,t} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Vuln.}_{s,t} \times \text{Mktshare}_{s,t} + \gamma X_{s,t} + \epsilon_{s,t+1} \end{aligned}$$

	$I_{s,t+1}/K_{s,t}$ (1)	$R_{s,t+1}/G_{s,t}$ (2)	Sale Growth $_{s,t+1}$ (3)	Cybersecurity Rel. $_{s,t+1}$ (4)
MktShare $_{s,t}$	0.568** (2.38)	1.304*** (3.65)	-0.066 (-0.43)	-0.080 (-1.33)
Vulnerability $_{s,t}$	-0.002 (-0.74)	0.002 (0.43)	-0.001 (-0.28)	0.014* (1.96)
MktShare $_{s,t} \times \text{Vuln.}_{s,t}$	-0.155*** (-2.84)	-0.115** (-2.01)	-0.091** (-2.30)	-0.042 (-0.38)
Supplier Controls $_{s,t}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supplier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	23,337	23,337	23,337	23,337
Adjusted r^2	0.141	0.395	-0.001	0.492

$$R_{s,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Vuln.}_{s,t} + \beta_2 \text{Mktshare}_{s,t} + \beta_3 \text{Vuln.}_{s,t} \times \text{Mktshare}_{s,t} + \gamma X_{s,t} + \epsilon_{s,t+1}$$

	Market-Adjusted _{s,t+1} (1)	CAPM _{s,t+1} (2)	5-factor Model _{s,t+1} (3)
MktShare _{s,t}	-0.003 (-0.45)	0.002 (0.26)	0.046*** (4.76)
Vulnerability _{s,t}	-0.001 (-0.51)	-0.004 (-1.26)	-0.007** (-2.16)
MktShare _{s,t} × Vuln. _{s,t}	-0.006*** (-3.42)	-0.006** (-2.09)	-0.003** (-2.15)
Supplier Controls _{s,t}	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supplier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,112	25,112	25,112
Adjusted r^2	0.621	0.167	0.069

$$CyberAttacks_{i,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 Vulnerabilities_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

	All Attacks _{i,t+1} (1)	Vulnerability Attacks _{i,t+1} (2)	Other Attacks _{i,t+1} (3)
Vulnerabilities _{i,t}	0.091*** (5.56)	0.104*** (11.09)	0.004 (0.23)
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,381	3,381	3,381
Adjusted r^2	0.130	0.209	0.074

- Dependent variable is the number of cyberattacks in each of the Fama-French 49 industries

$$Risk\ Var_{i,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 Vulnerabilities_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

	RetVol _{<i>i,t+1</i>} (1)	Ivol _{<i>i,t+1</i>} (2)	Var 95% _{<i>i,t+1</i>} (3)	LPSD _{<i>i,t+1</i>} (4)
Vulnerabilities _{<i>i,t</i>}	0.026*** (3.73)	0.037*** (4.62)	-0.016** (-2.38)	0.016** (2.38)
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,381	3,381	3,381	3,381
Adjusted r^2	0.180	0.293	0.143	0.139

$$Real\ Var_{i,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 Vulnerabilities_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

	$I_{i,t+1}/K_{i,t}$ (1)	$R_{i,t+1}/G_{c,t}$ (2)	Sales Growth $_{i,t+1}$ (3)	Cybersecurity Relation $_{i,t+1}$ (4)
Vulnerabilities $_{i,t}$	-0.104* (-1.78)	-0.098* (-1.78)	0.013 (0.38)	0.148*** (6.63)
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,228	3,228	3,228	3,228
Adjusted r^2	0.049	0.050	0.024	0.800

$$Real\ Var_{i,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_1 Vulnerabilities_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

	Market-Adjusted _{<i>i,t+1</i>} (1)	CAPM _{<i>i,t+1</i>} (2)	5-factor Model _{<i>i,t+1</i>} (3)
Vulnerabilities _{<i>i,t</i>}	-0.003** (-2.39)	-0.004** (-2.57)	-0.001* (-1.71)
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,381	3,381	3,381
Adjusted r^2	-0.003	0.012	0.006