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The New York Innovation Center bridges the worlds of finance, technology, and innovation and generates insights into high-value central bank-related opportunities.
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May 2020 Revised January 2026
JEL classification: G21, G24, G30
Authors: Kristian S. Blickle, Quirin Fleckenstein, Sebastian Hillenbrand, and Anthony Saunders
We examine how lead arrangers’ ownership stakes in syndicated loans evolve after origination, complementing prior research on lead shares at origination. Lead arrangers tend to retain shares in bankheld loans but frequently sell shares in loans distributed to institutional investors, typically within days of origination. The frequency of these loan sales has increased over time, aligning with the rise of the originate-to-distribute model. Importantly, we find no evidence that loan sales are associated with worse performance. Additional evidence suggests that exposure through other loans, temporary retention during syndication, and reputation concerns help mitigate information asymmetries in the syndicated loan market.
The author declares that he has no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and SNC data review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.
Quirin Fleckenstein
The author declares that he has no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and SNC data review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.
Sebastian Hillenbrand
The author declares that he has no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and SNC data review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.
Anthony Saunders
The author declares that he has no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. Prior to circulation, this paper was reviewed in accordance with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and SNC data review policy, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/index.html.
